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CONSPIRACY-OBvIOUS FRAUD-PEoPLE V. GILMAN, 80 N. W. 4 (Mich.).-In
a prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the public by pretending to be a spirit.ualistic medium and give seances it was hld to be immaterial that theevidence was obtained by a detective who paid his fee without being deceived
by the imposture. The conspiracy was complete when formed.
In this case the court does not decide that all persons who claim to bemediums are impostors and liable to prosecution, for the facts proved ofthemselves that the defendant was not a bona fide spiritualist.. It is hard to seeon what grounds a court could pronounce spiritualism a humbug, provided theparties concerned actually believed in it. No court ought to dictate what aman shall hold. as a religion or ethical tenet, nor should it pronounce anyhonest belief in these matters unworthy of a man of ordinary intelligence.
CONTRACTS-REFORMATION-EQUITY JURISDIcTIoN-RAILwAY ADVERTISING
CO. V. STANDARD ROCK CANDY Co., 6o N. Y. Sup. 228 (Supreme Court, Appel.late Term).-Plaintiff sued in a municipal court on a contract providing that
defendant should pay plaintiff $112.20 per month for placing defendants'
advertising placards in the street cars of certain cities. It appeared thatboth parties agreed that'the sum paid for such advertising should be the same
as that paid under a former contract in another city, $102 per month, and thatthe larger sum appeared in the latter contract by mistake. The court
instructed the jury that, if they found from the evidence that it was the under-standing that defendant was to spend as much under the latter contract as
under the earlier, they should find a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $102 andinterest. Held, "that the instruction did not assume ,the exercise of equity
power, and virtually allow a reformation of the contract sued on and a recov-ery after reformation, and was not erroneous, when the parties had litigated
the question as to what the. contract was, without objection." MacLean, J..
dissented from this opinion.
The charge to the jury and their subsequent finding would seem to be inerror, because the defendant, by its answer set up no other contract than theone declared on in the complaint, for $112.20, nor did any other appear inthe pleadings. The charge and finding seem to be a virtual assumption ofequity powers, apparently recognizing the plaintiffs right of recovery uponthe contract suedupon but re reforming that contract because of a mutualmistake therein, and then allowing recovery on the reformed contract. Thiswas extra jurisdiction. Fence v. Ellsworth, (Com. Pl.) 19 N. Y. Sup. 659.Reformation is a purely equitable remedy, and it is hard to see how it can begranted in a case where a plaintiff does not ask for it, but sues in his commonlaw rights under a contract, even if it be in a Code State." Even if itbe not. in effect, reformation," says MacLean, j., ,, then it mustbe conceded to be a recovery on a cause of action not pleaded, and we maysay as was said in Reed v. c onnell, 133 N. Y. 433, 31 N. E. 22. ' Thisrecovery was in violation of the rule that no judgment can be sustained infavor of a plaintiff on a cause of action not alleged in the complaint unless thedefendant, by his silence or conduct, acquiesced in the trial of the new and dif-ferent cause of action."'
The majority of the court base their affirmance of the judgment, frst,"upon the liberaly, almost informality of practice sanctioned in the munici-pal court; second, upon the provisions of Section 3063 of the Code of CivilFrocedure, and third, upon the fact that the parties had, without objection
3
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litigated the question as to what the contract was." Code Civ. Proc., § 3o63,
provides that the Appellate Court must render justice according 
to the Justice
of the case, and without regard to technical defects, which 
do not affect the
merits, and that it may reverse or affirm a judgment for 
errors of law or fact.
It is hard to see what application this has to the case under 
discussion, since
there would be no injustice in compelling recourse to the 
remedy of reforma-
tion before bringing suit, and since it can hardly be 
regarded as a technical
defect for suit to be brought on one cause of action and 
recovery had under
.another. The cogency of the third reason, namely, that 
the parties had been
allowed to litigate what the contract really was, is not apparent. 
All the tes-
timony on this point could only serve to show that there 
had been a mutual
mistake as to the contract, that the real contract was something 
different from
that which appeared in the written instrument, and that there 
was need of the
equitable remedy of reformation.
BASEMENTS-RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEE-COMPENSATIoN-FERNIE 
v. CHIcAGO,
R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 58 Pac. 492 (Kansas).-A mortgagor 
of land granted the
right of way to a railroad company without the consent of the 
mortgagee, and
without any proceeding to condemn the land. Held, that a 
purchaser at a
foreclosure sale under the mortgage or his grantee may 
sue the company for
compensation, but cannot recover damages incident to 
the entry before he
acquired title to the land.
This case seems to be correct on principle. Perkins v. Pitts, ix Mass. 125,
,Meriam v. Brown, 128 Mass., 391, is an almost parallel case, 
holding as in the
preent case that the rails were real fixtures 
and became a part of the land.
Although this is, without doubt, good law, there are decisions 
to the contrary.
Black River &- Morristown Ry. Co. v. Barnard, 
16 N. Y. xo4; Cohen v.
St. L., Ft. S. &- W4. By. Co., 34 Kan. 158.
VIDENcEz-REQuiRNG PRODUCTION OF DocumENrrs-IN RE COMINGORE,
CoLLEcTOR, 96 FED. 5 52.-The reports made by a distiller, 
or by a storekeeper
or other officers to a collector under the internal revenue 
laws are in no sense
public records, and cannot be produced in court as evidence.
The question here hinges on the public nature of the 
storekeeper's report.
If they are made "for the benefit of the public" (I Greenl., Sec. 
483), it would
seem that the State officials' call for them as evidence should 
be respected. If
they are the private property of the government, the Secretary 
of the Treasury
has undoubtedly the rig t to order them refused as 
evidence. Their purpose
is to give the collector information as to the quantity 
of dstilled spirits i the
warehouse, and they are not open to the public. But 
cases canoe imagined
where the public would be benefited by knowing such reports. 
There isnoth-
ing in them which the distiller has a right to demand should 
be secret, nor
anything which can injure the public welfare or interest. 
And it has been
held In re Hirsch, 74 Fed. 9 28, that a collector must 
give as evidence the appli-
cation of a person for a license. The weight of authority, 
however. seems to be
with the court in the present case. Inre Huttman, 70 Fed. 699; In re Weeks,
82 Fed. 729.
EVIDENCE-WMS---MENTAL CAPAcrry-PowERs Ex'R. 
uT A. v. Powxas
ET AL., 52 S. W. 845 (Ky.).-Evidence was offered 
as to the amount of property
the testator had at a considerable time before his 
death and that he had a
much less amount at his death. Held, that perhaps 
such evidence was admis-
sible as showing the testator had not the mental capacity 
to make a will.
There seems to have been some doubt in the mind of the 
court as to the
admissibility of this evidence and it is improbable that 
the decision will be
anywhere followed. Such evidence is extremely remote from 
the issue and, by
itself, of almost no effect, since the law has liong been established 
that had
management or waste of an estate or want of understandng to transact 
even
the ordinary business of life does not affect testamentary capacity. 
Whitney
v. TwOmbly, 136 Mass. 145; Hall v. Ha , 17 Pick. 
(Mass.) 373.
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FRATERNAL COLLEGE SOCIETIES-EXPULSION OF SUBORDINATE CHAPTERS-
INJUNCTION-HEATON ET AL. V. HULL ET AL., 59 N. Y. Sup. 281.-Charges
were brought against a chapter of a college fraternal organization by its presi-
dent because of lack of culture and refinement among the women of the college.
No proof was offered that any rule of the order was broken except the exhi-
bition of the constitution to counsel by a member of the order. No causes for
expulsion are provided for by the constitution. Nor was any chance given the
chapter to defend itself against the charges. Held, the court would enjoin
consummation of the expulsion.
In the absence of defined regulations as to the causes for expulsion, it
would seem that the ordinary principles of justice would govern. In Peo.le v.
N. Y. Produce .Exchange, 149 N. Y. 4oi, it was held that the causes of suspen-
sion and expulsion must be stated with reasonable certainty in the notice and
the cause for action must be within the scope of the by-laws. But this case
refers mainly to membership in corporations, but no distinction is recognized
between corporations and voluntary unincorporated associations. The chief
value of membership and association with members of other chapters of frater-
nal organizations lies in the initiation by a chapter of good standing, and the con-
tinuance of privileges as members of the local chapter. When that value has
been destroyed, the blow comes home directly to all those who have become
members of the local chapter, and so their individual rights would apparently
be invaded.
GAs COMP IEs-DISCRIMINATION-BAiLEY V. FAYETTE GAs-FuEL Co., 44
Atlan. 251 (Penn.).-Held, that a company incorporated for the purpose of
supplying gas both for heating and lighting cannot discriminate by charging
more for gas for lighting than for heating.
Unlawful discrimination is a term generally used to indicate a breach of a
statutory or common-law duty to treat all customers alike, i. e., there must be
no discrimination if there is an equality of conditions with respect to all
customers affected. The American doctrine of legislative control over the
rates of warehousemen is well settled in the case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.,
T13, and has of late years been applied to the regulation of the rates of gas
companies, but with recognition of the fact that such control is not arbitrary
and is always subject to judicial determination. The justification of such
legislative control is the quasi-public nature of warehousemen, railroad, gas,
ferry and bridge companies. In the case in question the conditions under
which the customers were supplied were both similar and equal, and the only
ground for discrimination was the differing value of the service to the
customer, i. e., that the furnishing of gas for lighting was more valuable to
the customer than the furnishing of gas for heating. Discrimination based on
such grounds has never been sustained in cases of companies of another
nature, and now for the first time it is decided that gas companies cannot
charge varying rates for differing uses of the same kind of gas. Many gas
companies in the different States have. made such a distinction in charges, and
if the courts of other States hold in accordance with the principal case these
companies will be most markedly affected. The decision seems based on a
logical interpretation of the doctrine of unfair rates and will in all probability
be sustained by future cases.
HIGHWAYS-REASONABLE USE BY OWNER OF THE LAND-NuisANcE--
LYMAN V. HOOFER, 44 Ad. 127 (Me.).
While it is true that adjacent owner, owning presumptively to the center
of a highway, may. subject to the public easement, make a reasonable use of
the land even within the location, yet a stack of hay with a white half cap, the
corners of which are unfastened and flapping in the wind. placed within the
highway about three feet from traveled part, is an object of such a character
as will naturally frighten horses ordinarily gentle and well broken, and there-
fore is not a reasonable use, but constitutes a nuisance. Most of the cases
of injury incurred on highways are against the municipalities for maintaining
a nuisance or permitting an abutting owner to do so. In Murray v. McShane,
52 Md. 217, the same rule of law was applied; the owner of land on which was
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a ruinous wall, which was declared a nuisance, being held liable. Regina v.
Watts, x Salk. 357, and Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567, is decided on same
ground.
LEASE-WHAT CONSTITUTES-GOLDMAN v. NEW YORK ADVERTISING CO.,
60 N. Y. Sup. 275.-The relation of landlord and tenant is not created where
for compensation one person gives another authority to use the wall of a house
for advertising purposes for a specified time.
Both appellant and defendant invoke legal principles that obtain between
landlord and tenant. The relation of landlord and tenant did not exist, as the
contract between the parties was not one for the possession and profits of lands
or tenements neither was it for the possession or right of possession to the
realty. In Lowell v. Strahan, 145 Mass. I, it was held that affixing a sign
to the wall in consideration of an annual payment was a license, and not
a lease. It was permission to do a particular act, and gave no authority to do
any other act upon the premises.
MASTER AND SERVANT-GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE-ESMPLOYERS' GOOD
FAiTH-MIscONDUCT-CoNTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT-EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTS-ALEN
v. AYLESWORTH ET AL., 44 Atlan. 178 (N. J.).-An employee whose faithful
service was sought by execution of a bond in his favor for an additional
remuneration in event of such faithful service, was discharged for endeavoring
to make secret examination of the employers' books. Held, that this was a
breach of contract on part of employee, and employers were entitled to dis-
charge him.
The court thoroughly exploits the right of a master to discharge an
employee on grounds all of which are not assigned at time of discharge.
This matter is well settled, for a master is never under obligation to assign any
reason for dismissal of a servant, provided he can show that good and sufficient
oause for dismissal existed at the time of discharge; Sterling E mory Wheel
Co. v. Magee, 40 Ill. App. 340, and further reasons for discharge may be
assigned even though unknown to master at the time the discharge was
made. Odeneal v. Heung, 70 Miss. 172. This is now the general American
doctrine. In the present case, the original cause for dismissal was the
unauthorized and clandestine examination of the master's books, and this
is held to be adequate cause for discharge as a breach of an implied condition
of employment. There are cases in which the betrayal of the employers'
secrets of trade was'good ground for discharge, but the present case seems
without precedent, as there was simply an endeavor to acquire the trade
secrets of the employers. The court seems to apply the general rule correctly,
as such an act would be a breach of a contract for good and faithful service.
Further, it is held that the anticipation by the master of disobedience to orders
by the servant does not constitute bad faith on the part of master in discharg-
ing such employee for the unauthorized examination of books. Smith,
faster and Servant, p. i5o, 151.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURIEs-LIABILITY FOR
AcTs OF STREET CLEANING DEPARTIENT-MISSONS ET AL. V. MAYOR, LTc., OF THE
CITY oF NEw YORK, 54 N. E. 744 (N. Y.).-The negligence of the driver of an
ash cart, employed in the street cleaning department, caused the death of
plaintiff's intestate. Held. that the city was liable, as it was acting in its pri-
vate capacity as distinguished from its governmental functions.
Judges O'Brien and Gray dissent and follow the doctrine of Maxmilian
v. Mayor, etc., 62 N. Y. i6o, and Ham v. Mayor, etc., 7o N. Y. 459. These two
cases have been authoritative until reversed by the present case. While it is
well settled that the city cannot be held liable while exercising its governmen-
tal functions, there is a conflict as to when the city is so acting. In Jewett v.
City of New Haven, 38 Conn. 368, it was held that the fire department, estab-
lished and organized under the provisions of the city charter, while engaged
in extinguishing fires, was performing a public, governmental act, and that
the city could not be held liable for injuries received through the negligence
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or misconduct of such department. In Hill v. Citzy of Boston, 122 Mass. 344.
it was held that a child attending a public school in a schoolhouse provided
by a city pursuant to a duty imposed upon it by the general laws, could not
maintain action against the city for an injury caused by reason of the unsafe
condition of a staircase over which he was passing. In Barnes v. District of
Columbia, 91 U. S. 54o, it was held that a city was responsible for an injury
caused owing to the defective condition of a street.
NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-QUIRK V. SIEGEL-COOPER Co.,
6o N. Y. Sup. 228 (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment).-Held, "The placing of a slippery slide in the middle of a section of
stairway over which customers were invited to ascend and descend, in such a
way as not to be likely to attract the attention of shoppers familiar with the
stairway, and without any means being adopted to warn such customers, is
negligence. Evidence that plaintiff, who was injured by slipping on the
slide, had passed down such stairway the day before, when no slide was there,
and that there was nothing to suggest danger unless she had looked directly
where she intended to place her foot, and the light was somewhat obscured,
is sufficient to sustain a finding that she was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence."
The general rule of a storekeeper towards customers invited into his store
to trade is to exercise reasonable care to keep the building safe for the use of
such customers, and under it the placing of a permanent slide over such a
flight of steps would not appear to be such lack of care as to amount to negli-
gence, since the slide would be visible to one ordinarily watchful of his move-
ments, and since, per statement of facts, there was abundant room to descend
the steps without going upon the slide. Nor would the temporary occupation
of a portion of the steps by a slide for trucks be wrongful in itsef. The
ground of the court in holding the defendant guilty of negligence lay in the
act that the obstruction was temporary, "and so nearly on a level with the
steps as not to be likely to attract the attention of shoppers familiar with the
stairs, but having no previous experience of any such obstruction upon
them. The defendant should have adopted some method of warning cus-
tomers of the presence of the obstacle."
In regard to the question of contributory negligence on the part of plain-
tiff, the fact that the slide was temporary and had not been there when plain-
tif pasedthesam sair th da beore ws cnclsiv indeermining that
plaintiff was not negligent. Ordinarily a person who exercises ordinary care
is bound to look where he sets his foot, but in a case such as this, where the
surroundings are familiar and there is nothingf to lead the iasser to su~jrose
that the-remises have been altered, ordinary care w not demand an
inspection of the locality. "Contributory negligence is not always the con-
sequence of failure to exercise the greatest prudence or to make use of the
best judgment. McRichardsv. Flint, 144N. Y. 222,21 N. B. i53. Because
of the low level of the slide and the obscured light there was no indication of
danger unless the plalntiff looked directly where she intended to step, and
from this close inspection she was excused because she was familiar with the
steps and they had not been obstructed when she last used them.
PATENTs-VALIDITY-INVrENTIONS LN FOREIGN COUNTRY-HANIFEN v. PuIcz,
96 Fed. 435.-One who has made an invention in a foreign country, and has
introduced the article into commercial use there before the granting of any
foreign patent or the description of the invention in any publication, may,
upon obtaining a patent in this country, carry back the date of his invention
to the actual time of making such invention in a foreign country so as to over-
come the defense of prior use in this country.
This is a new point, and although this decision of the circuit court upholds
the view previously taken on the same subject in Han/fen v. E. H. Godshalk
Co., 78 Fed. 811. we may expect to find still further adjudication on it It
seems to be decided on the principle in Seymour v. Osborne, ii Wall. i6,
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555, that an invention patented here is not to be defeated by a prior foreign
patent, provided nothing has been done which enables one in this country to
practice the invention without making experiments. The granting of a patent
here is independent of what may have been done abroad, if the article is not in
general use by the American public.
RAILROADS-WATCHMAN AT CRossiNG--AcCIDENT To DEAF PERSON-PISKO-
ROWSKI v. DETROIT, G. H. & M. R. P. Co., 80 M. W. 24! (Mich.)-A deaf man
walking along a railroad track attempted to cross the same at a street cross-
ing where a flagman was stationed to give warning of the approach of trains.
Before starting across he had been hailed by workmen on an approaching
hand-car, but failed to hear their call and was injured by the car in conse-
quence. He had no warning from the flagman of the hand-car's approach.
Held, that no negligence could be imputed to the company because of the
flagman's neglect to warn, when he did not know that the injured man was
deaf.
This seems to be a strange and not altogether correct decision in view of
the general rule that a person injured while crossing a railroad track at a
street crossing has a right to rely, as the plaintiff did. on the flagman to give
him notice of the approach of trains. Cf. Richmond v. R. R. Co., 87 Mich.
374, where plaintiff recovered damages because the necessity of a warning
was apparent to the flagman, but he neglected the duty of giving notice of an
approaching train.
The fact that the operators of the hand-car gave warning ought not to
excuse the flagman from doing the same, for it would seem to be as much his
duty to give notice of the approach of a hand-car as to warn persons of an
oncoming locomotive or train, and this duty should exist irrespective of
whether the men on the hand-car gave notice or not. The placing of flagmen
at street crossings in populous districts is an additional safeguard required,
besides the warning signals from trains themselves.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-ExTENT TO WHICH ALLOWED-SADDLERY HARDWARE
Co. v. HILLSBORO MILLS, 44 Atl. 300 (N. H.).-Defendant agreed in writing
to sell and ship to plaintiff 622 blankets of different styles, at prices specified
and "not to sell blankets to anyone else in New York City." There
was no limitationi as to time. Held, the contract being in restraint of
trade, is not to be extended by construction beyond the fair and natural
import of the language used, and that agreement will continue only for such
length of time as will afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity for disposing
of the goods in the usual course of trade with the exercise of due diligence.
This principle of construction shows the disfavor in which the law still
holds contracts in restraint of trade. As was said in a New York case, Green-
feldv. Gilman, (14o N. Y. x68), "while the law, to a certain extent, tolerates
contracts in restraint of trade or business, and will uphold them, they are not
to be treated with special indulgence." The same principle was applied in
determining the territorial limits in which contracts operated as a restraint in
Smith v. Martin, 8o Ind. 26o. and in Roller v. Ott 14 Kan. 6o9. it was saidpro.visions of such a contract should not be extended by construction or impli-
cation beyond what their terms clearly require. Harkinson's A#fieal, 78 Pa
St. i96, is to the same effect.
SHIPPING-TzsT OF MAsrzR-Lu~marrY OF OwNE's-GTTxR ET AL. v.
PACIFIC WHALING CO., 96 Fed. 616.-The masters of two whaling ships,
together with natives living on shore, took from an ice-bound vessel, without
consent of those in charge, certain provisions. Reld, that the principle of
joint tort feaser does not apply, and that the owners of one of the vessels
could only be held liable for the value of such stores taken as were used by
his ship, and which it would have been within the scope of the master's em-
ployment to secure.
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In this case we find the principle of joint tort feasers modified by the rules
that govern the relation of principal and servant. If the master of the
offendng vessel had been sued he could have been held as a joint tort feaser
for the entire damage resulting from the acts of all. But if the plaintiff elects
to sue the company, it seems that he must forego the advantage that an action
against the master would give him. For by the law of torts he can only hold
the company liable to the extent of such acts of the master as were in the
scope of his authority. Armoryv. Delamirie, i Strang. 5o5.
TAxATioN-UFoRmiTY-IN RE PAGE, 58 Pac. Rep. 478 (Kansas).-At the
last session of the Kansas Legislature an act was passed providing for the
taxation of contracts of insurance made with insurance companies not author-
ized to do business in the State. Held, to be unconstitutional for lack of uni-
formity.
This enactment is illustrative of the hostility of petty officials toward
wealthy corporations who are non-residents. In Kansas it is required that all
property shall be taxed at its true value in money. The point was wel emade
by the court that the tax was not uniform, as no account i taken of the sol-
vency of the company, or that the values of other property may fluctuate, or
the rate of taxation thereon may change from year to year, while the rate of
taxation levied on the property in question remains unchange~. The ununi-
formity of imposing a tax on a man who insures in a company .unauthorized
to do business i the State, and the exempting of his neighbor who insures in
a licensed company, is obviously unconstitutional. County of Santa Clara v.
Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 18 Fed. 385.
TRADE-NAmES-INJuNCTIoN-UsE OF OwN NA E-ARmRIm v. A~muI,
59 N. Y. Sup. 948-"Arnheim the Tailor" dropped the word "Tailor"
and adopted the name "Marks Arnheim." Two years later the de-
fendant, whose father-in-law had once used the name "Arnheim the Tailor"
in New York, but had abandoned it twelve years before and moved to Chicago,
opened a store in New York, using the name "Arnheim the Tailor." She
issued receipts, guarantees, and catalogues similar to the plaintiff's and used
similar boxes, ordering them from the same people. She exhibited a photo-
graph of the plaintiff as that of the proprietor of her store and arranged her
store practically in the same manner as the plaintiff's. Held, the plaintiff was
entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from the use of the word
"Arnheim" as a trade-mark.
The case shows how absolute has become the authority of the doctrine of
"Fair Trade." The defendant was entitled to use her own name as a trade-
mark in a business conducted on its own merits and not feeding upon the repu-
tation earned by the sagacity of another. Chas. S. Higgins Co. v. Hggins
Soafi Co., 14 4 N. Y. 462; Devlin v. Devlin, 69 N. Y. 212; Gilman v. Runne
well, 122 Mass. 139; Saxlehner v. Afillinaris CoMfiany, 1897 L. P. i Ch.
893; Hires Co. v. Hires, x82 Pa. St. 346.
TRusTs-LIamuTY OF FUND Fox DzBTs OF BENzEicuimAy-FmsTr NATIONAL
BANK OF PLAiazmD v. MoaRIMEr, 6o N. Y. Sup. 47.-A mother devised prop-
erty in trust, the income therefrom to be applied to the use of her son during
his lifetime, and giving said son power to dispose of the: property by wilL
Held, that neither the principal or income of such fund could be subjected to
the payment of the beneficiary's debts, even for necessaries, and also, that as
it is impossible to determine how much of such income is a surplus over and
above the proper necessities of the beneficiary, such surplus cannotbe reached.
Although this decision is based upon statute law and is in harmony with
the prior New York decisions (Graf v. Bennett, 3! N. Y. 12; Williams V.
Thorn et. al., 70 N. Y. 270), yet it is of interest inasmuch as it is oppoit
to the more generally accepted view. It also points out the extreme Olirity
extended to such trusts, and the tendency of New York to enlarge the doctrine
as existing in other States.
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The English rule has been in favor of the right to a pply trust property to
the satisfaction of the beneficiary's debts, regardless of the #roVisions of the
settlor. i Smith Leading, Cases ug; Dick v. Pitchford, i Der. & Bat. 480.
It has been followed in this country by the weight of authority, but subject to
the rule that some minor limitations upon the liability of the trust fund should
be allowed. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 725; Leavitt v. Birne, 21 Conn. i;
27 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 237; MlcIlwaine v. Smith, 92 Am. Dec. 295;
Mandlebaum v. McDonald, 29 Mich. 781. These limitations, however, have
never been of great indulgence to the beneficiary, usually providing for the
cessation of his interest upon his insolvency or attempt to subject it to debts.
WILLS-EXECUTION-SIGNATURE AT THE END-IN RE ANDREWS' WILL, 60
N. Y. Sup. 141.-A will was drawn on a printed blank folded in the
middle so as to constitute four pages connected at the side. A printed intro-
duction and clauses in writing occupied the first page, and on the reverse side
of same was contained an appointment of executors, attestation, etc., properly
filled in and signed by the testator and witnesses. At the top of this was
written "third page." On what would ordinarily be called the third page
various clauses disposing of the property were entered. At the top of this
page was marked "second page." Held, not properly executed and signed
under a statute requiring a will to be "signed at the end thereof."
At first impression this seems unnecessarily rigid, especially in view of its
being so often done in ordinary correspondence on paper so folded. But the
statute was passed to remedy an evil. If a will could be so made on a printed
form, why not in like manner, though entirely written. What would then pre-
vent the adding of a page to a -will b~y simply wrting'" 3d page" where it
would very naturally have been omitted byte testator, and " 2d page". upon
the part added. Hays v. Harden, 6 Pa. 413; Wineland's Ajfieal, 118 Pa.
St. 37; Glancey v. Glancey, 17 Ohio, 134; Sisters of Charity v. Kelly, 67 N. Y.
410; Matter of O'Neill, g1 N. Y. 516.
